We study the optimal design of regulation for innovative activities which can exhibit negative externalities and we allow for the possibility of corruption of public officials. We compare two alternative regimes which may provide firms with different incentives to innovate and produce: a regime of lenient authorization and a regime of strict authorization. We find that the choice of the authorization regime critically depends on the regulator's ability to use a tax. If the tax is contingent on the evidence collected by the public official, a regime of lenient authorization is always optimal. As the regulator's ability to use a tax is more limited, the regime of strict authorization may become desirable. This is particularly the case when the risk of corruption is high. Corruption exacerbates the costs of using lenient authorization, under which production of socially harmful goods is always authorized.
Introduction
There is often uncertainty surrounding the social effects of new products or production techniques that firms have developed and would like to market or use. For instance, a pharmaceutical company may be willing to sell a drug, which may or may not entail serious side effects. Or an energy firm may adopt a new drilling technique which allows extracting oil where it was not possible before, but this extraction technique may cause some substantial damages to the environment. The possible presence of negative externalities creates a need for regulation: ideally, only the production or the adoption of those activities for which private benefits outweigh expected social costs ought to be authorized.
Unfortunately, there might not be conclusive evidence about the expected externalities associated with such activities. When this is the case, a benevolent regulator faces the choice between two suboptimal regimes. A regime of lenient authorization whereby an activity is authorized unless conclusive evidence that it is socially harmful is collected, and a regime of strict authorization whereby an activity is authorized only if conclusive evidence that it is not socially harmful is collected. In the real world, new products or technologies which may cause harm to the public are regulated differently according to their riskiness. In the case of drugs or vaccines, the risk for public safety can be extremely high. 1 Accordingly, in most countries there is an intense scrutiny before drugs can be marketed to ensure that they do not present serious risks for patients (for an international comparison of drug approval procedures, see Mulaje, 2013) . For innovation in other fields, the approach followed by countries or states differ. For instance, consider hydraulic fracturing for which wide scientific consensus on environmental hazard is currently lacking. In France and Vermont the regulator has adopted a strict authorization regime invoking the precautionary principle, which states that an activity should be prohibited in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence proving that it is not socially harmful. 2,3 Other countries and states, especially those which are oil rich like Texas, generally allow using hydraulic fracturing while additional evidence on its effect on the environment is collected.
In this paper, we develop a simple model to study the optimal design of regulation of these activities which can have negative social repercussions. In doing so, we take into account that not only do these regimes impact on production choices, but they may also affect those investment decisions that ultimately lead to the development of innovative activities. Moreover, we also consider how the possibility of corruption of public officials impacts on the optimal regulatory architecture. The fact that corruption is a prominent issue in this context, and cannot be downplayed in determining the socially desirable regulatory regime, is due to the large private benefits that the actors involved could split. There is ample anecdotal evidence documenting how public officials engaged in the regulation or authorization of new products and techniques receive bribes to expedite and smooth the approval process. 4 The risk and the costs of regulatory capture are well known and affect both wealthy and developing countries. The former may have stronger institutions, but the gains from collusion that officials and firms can reap are 1 In 1937, a preparation called Elixir Sulfanilamide, which had not undergone safety studies caused the deaths of more than 100 people in the U.S. and is believed to have hastened the enactment of the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (see Ballentine, 1981) .
2 There are several definitions of the precautionary principle, which is often invoked in international treatises. One of the most notable is the 1992's Rio Declaration on environment and development, whose Principle 15 reads: "... Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." 3 For the France's and Vermont's bans on on hydraulic fracturing see "France cements fracking ban" on
The Guardian, October 11, 2013, and Vermont H.464 (Act 152 ) "An act relating to hydraulic fracturing wells for natural gas and oil production" signed by the State Governor on May 16, 2012, respectively. 4 For instance, see "China jails former drug regulatory official for taking bribes: state media" on Reuters, January 3, 2017 where it is reported that a former official of the China Food and Drug Administration was jailed for accepting bribes to smooth drug approval processes.
huge given the size of their internal markets. 5 On the other hand, the latter may find it difficult to prevent regulatory capture, due to their limited budgets, lower-skilled human resources, and lower accountability (for a discussion, see Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009 , and reference therein). Interestingly, corruption opportunities differ between the two regulatory regimes: under lenient authorization, the public official may conceal evidence unfavorable to the firm in exchange for a bribe. This collusive agreement would lead to excessive production and, in turn, excessive investment. In contrast, under strict authorization, the public official may be willing to blackmail the firm, demanding some money under the threat that evidence favorable to the firm will be concealed if the firm refuses to give in. This might undermine investment incentives.
While there is a large literature in economics studying the optimal regulatory design when activities generate negative externalities, few papers have considered how regulation impacts on investment decisions. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, none has investigated the role played by the possibility of corruption in shaping the choice of the optimal regulatory regime.
In the model, we consider a firm which must decide whether or not to invest resources to develop an innovative product which gives the firm higher private benefits, namely higher profits. If the firm manages to innovate, the good may be socially beneficial or harmful, in the sense that social costs more than offset private benefits. The socially optimal investment trades off the private gains of innovation against its social costs. In the absence of regulation, the firm will never internalize the external effects of its innovative activity and this will lead to over-investment. We assume that a benevolent regulator can send a public official to collect evidence on the social harm that the innovative activity may cause. The evidence may or may not be conclusive, though, and, to make matters worse, the public official may be able to conceal the information he has found, which gives rise to corruption opportunities. The regulator chooses between the two alternative authorization regimes to maximize social welfare, taking into account the different types of corruption they engender.
We find that the choice of the authorization regime critically depends on the regulator's ability to use a tax as an instrument to align firm's investment and production decisions with the interests of society. If the tax can be made contingent on the evidence collected by the public official, a regime of lenient authorization is always optimal. Intuitively, under such regime it is always possible to replicate the outcome achievable under strict authorization by adequately setting the tax. Namely, by imposing a prohibitively high tax when the signal is uninformative. Moreover, in some instances, it is possible to do strictly better with lenient authorization. This is the case whenever outright prohibition of activities when evidence is inconclusive is not socially desirable.
5 Regulatory bodies often hire people with industry ties and is often unclear whether they act in the public of industry interest. See, for instance, "Conflict of interests at the F.D.A." on The New York Times, April 13, 2015.
If a signal-contingent tax is not allowed, e.g. legal restrictions are in place or the tax authority and the regulator are separated entities and do not coordinate their actions, such perfect alignment of social and private interests might not be possible. In this scenario, the regime of strict authorization may be socially desirable. Unlike lenient authorization, strict authorization is a more prudent approach because it never authorizes production of socially harmful goods. This benefit comes at the cost of a loss of opportunity: production of goods which are socially beneficial will not be authorized when conclusive evidence is not available. When the potential negative repercussions on society outweigh such loss of opportunity, the regime of strict authorization is preferred. Notably, the likelihood that strict authorization is chosen is increasing in the corruption risk. This is because corruption dramatically exacerbates the costs of using lenient authorization, under which production of socially harmful goods would always be authorized. In contrast, corruption under strict authorization only affects the distribution of the gains stemming from authorizing production of beneficial goods between the public official and the firm. If the tax can be made contingent solely on production, then the firm will have a lower tax burden the higher the likelihood of facing a corrupt public official. By properly tailoring the tax to such probability, the firm can be provided with the same investment incentives as when corruption is never an issue and therefore welfare is unaffected by the corruption risk.
Related Literature. Our paper relates to different strands of the economics literature on regulation. At least since the seminal paper by Becker and Stigler (1974) , economists have taken into account how the possibility that enforces can engage in corruption affects the design of regulatory institutions. Besley and McLaren (1993) and Mookherjee and Png (1995) study the optimal compensation policy for tax collectors and inspectors, respectively. The former find that paying the tax collectors efficiency wages, which deter collusion with certainty, may not be optimal. The latter study linear incentive pay and highlight that small increases in such rewards may backfire, because they may lead to higher bribes. Hiriart et al. (2010) show that ex-ante and ex-post monitors, i.e. regulators and courts, should be two separate entities and determine the set of transfers and fines which deter collusion. In our model, corruption is an equilibrium phenomenon and we do not allow for transfers paid by the regulator to the public officials in order to motivate information disclosure. Namely, we study the design of regulation in a world of incomplete contracts which appears to be more realistic: wages contingent on the content of the public official's report are little used in practice and likely infeasible, as also argued by Dal Bó (2006) and Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) .
In the paper we compare alternative regulatory regimes, taking into account their effects on both production and investment incentives, which has attracted more scholarly attention lately. In particular, Anderlini et al. (2013) compare flexible and rigid legal regimes. In the former the regulatory standard is decided after the R&D investment has been made, whereas in the latter it is decided ex-ante. Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2013) assume that both regulators and courts can collect information about product safety and investigate whether authorization from the regulatory body should provide firms with safe harbor from future negligence penalties. They find that this is indeed the case if social returns to activities are sufficiently large. Our paper is more closely related to Immordino et al. (2011) who assume that there might not be conclusive evidence about product safety and compare different regimes, including lenient and strict authorization, which may provide firms with different incentives to innovate and produce. Our contribution to this ongoing debate on the optimal regulatory regime is to explicitly allow for the corruption risk and to highlight how taxation could be profitably used in this context to align private firm's interests with those of the society.
Outline. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the setup and presents two benchmarks. Section 3 develops the main analysis of the paper. Section 4 shows how alternative assumptions concerning the regulator's ability to set the tax that the firm faces affects the results. Section 5 enriches the analysis by discussing the relationship between ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
Setup
A profit-maximizing firm must decide the level of R&D expenditures to develop a new production technology or a marketable product. The problem of the benevolent regulator is to decide whether or not to authorize the use of the innovation which may exhibit negative externalities. At the beginning of the game, the regulator commits to a policy, being aware of its incentive effects on the firm's investment decision.
In stage 1, the firm decides on the innovation intensity I ∈ [0, 1], which coincides with the probability of a breakthrough, at cost cI 2 2 with c > 0. If no innovation is discovered the firm produces a standard good which gives profit normalized to 0. If innovation is successful, the firm can produce the new product which would yield gross profits Π > 0. In stage 2 the firm privately learns whether the good is socially harmful or not. Specifically, the state ω can be either safe or unsafe, i.e. ω ∈ {S, U }, and β ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the state is unsafe. The probability distribution of the states is known to both the regulator and the firm.
If the state is safe the probability that an accident occurs is S , while if the state is unsafe the probability of an accident is U , with S < U . An accident generates a social harm H irrespective of whether the good is safe or not. The expected harm caused by the good is h S (h U ) if the good is safe (unsafe), with h S < Π < h U . Therefore, the innovation is socially harmful, and the good should not be produced, if the state is unsafe. If the state is safe, the innovation would have minor externalities and it would be socially beneficial. We define π = Π − h S as the net social benefit of the safe product and ∆ = h U − h S as the differential externality between the two states. Note that our assumption on the social benefit (harm) of a safe (unsafe) innovation implies that ∆ > π > 0.
Benchmarks
We consider two benchmarks against which alternative regulatory regimes must be compared.
First, we illustrate the first-best outcome that would be achieved if a benevolent regulator could control investment and production choices directly. Such regulator would produce only if the innovation is socially beneficial, namely if the state is safe. Therefore, first-best investment is determined from:
cI 2 2 so that the optimal investment is:
The optimal investment is increasing in the probability that the good is safe, 1 − β, and the net social benefit of the safe product, π. A higher marginal cost of innovation reduces the optimal investment. In what follows, we maintain the following assumption which guarantees that I * < 1:
The marginal cost of the investment in R&D is such that it would not be optimal to guarantee that a breakthrough is achieved with probability 1. Expected social welfare in this first-best world is:
The second benchmark we contemplate is a regime of laissez-faire, namely one where the regulator never intervenes. Being unfettered, the innovative firm would always produce an innovative product, irrespective of its social repercussions. Thus, the investment in innovation is determined from the following expression:
Comparing (3) to (1) it is immediate to see that whenever β > 0 and h S > 0 there would be too much investment from a social viewpoint. Social welfare in a regime of laissez-faire is:
The rationale for regulation of innovative activities is provided by the positive wedge existing between (4) and (2). A regime of laissez-faire would give rise to excessive innovation and lead to production even when the newly-developed product is socially harmful.
Note that if a benevolent regulator could outright prohibit or authorize innovative activities but could not tax firm's profits nor obtain evidence of the product safety, its guidelines should be the following. If I LF = Π c , innovation activities should be allowed only if β < π−h S 2∆ . Similarly, if I LF = 1 investment in innovation should be allowed only if β < π−2c ∆ . In general, it would be more likely to authorize innovative activities if the probability that the product is socially harmful were lower.
Regulation of Innovative Activities
In this section, we assume that the regulator can send some public official to collect evidence about the social benefits of the innovative good, i.e. whether it is socially harmful or not, after a breakthrough occurs. Conclusive evidence about the social repercussions of producing the good is found with probability p < 1. The regulator can condition the authorization of production on the evidence reported by the public official. As mentioned in the introduction, we distinguish between two authorization regimes. In a lenient authorization regime, the firm is allowed to produce unless there is conclusive evidence that the good is unsafe. In a strict authorization regime, the firm is allowed to produce only if there is conclusive evidence that the good is safe. The difference between the two approaches emerges when there is no conclusive evidence about the social harm which can be caused by the production of the good.
We also assume that the benevolent regulator can commit to a tax t ∈ R + that a firm must pay in order to undertake production of the innovative product. 6 Our aim is to determine the optimal authorization regime and relate it to the severity of the corruption concerns.
Honest public officials
Suppose first that there are no corruption opportunities. For instance, the benevolent regulator itself collects evidence about the social effects of producing the good. In a regime of lenient authorization, production of beneficial goods will always be allowed, whereas production of socially harmful goods will be prohibited with probability p. Therefore, lenient authorization may lead to type-II errors, namely approval of production of unsafe goods.
In this authorization regime, the firm's investment decision at stage 1 solves:
In the next section, we study alternative environments where the tax cannot be used as a regulatory tool or when it can be made contingent on the regulatory evidence, too. The setting analyzed in this section is the one that we deem to be more realistic.
Note that (1 − β) + β(1 − p) = 1 − βp. Therefore, the optimal investment as a function of t satisfies the following:
and welfare, also expressed as a function of t, gives:
Note that t is a transfer and as such it only affects investment incentives but not the surplus that can be generated by producing the innovative activity. In stage 0 the regulator will announce the tax that a firm will have to pay if production is allowed. The following lemma characterizes the tax, investment, and welfare levels in a regime of lenient supervision when public officials are honest.
Lemma 1. When public officials are honest, in a regime of lenient authorization the regulator sets the following tax if production is allowed
whereas the firm does not pay any tax if production does not take place. The investment in innovation satisfies the following:
and social welfare is:
The tax that the regulator may set can be such that the firm is not willing to invest, in which case welfare is zero. Investment and welfare are increasing in the social benefits of the innovation and decreasing in the potential harm. There is a positive relationship between the accuracy of the signal p and the level of the investment and social welfare because a higher level of p makes it more likely that a socially harmful innovation will be prohibited. Investment and welfare negatively depend on β, namely on the probability that the innovation would cause harm if produced.
If authorization is strict, socially harmful goods are never produced but some socially beneficial goods may be prohibited too. In other words, strict authorization may lead to type-I errors, namely prohibition of production of safe goods. The firm's investment decision at stage 1 solves:
Therefore, the investment decision as a function of the tax t is:
and welfare gives:
The following lemma characterizes the level of taxation, investment, and welfare that would arise in a regime of strict authorization.
Lemma 2. When public officials are honest, in a regime of strict authorization the regulator sets t SA = h S if production is allowed. The investment equation satisfies
Since production is allowed only if the good is safe, the tax is set in such a way that the firm must pay for the expected harm that production of a safe good may bring about, namely h S . The investment is always positive and so is social welfare. A higher p increases the probability that evidence that the good is safe is uncovered, thereby allowing production. Therefore, a higher p is associated with a higher investment and welfare.
The optimal second-best regime in the absence of corruption is determined by comparing W SA and W LA . In the following proposition we show under what condition the regime of lenient authorization is to be preferred to one of strict authorization. We also highlight differences in investment and tax levels between the two regimes.
Proposition 1. When public officials are honest, the benevolent regulator prefers a regime of lenient authorization to one of strict authorization if and only if π ≥ β∆. A regime of lenient authorization always entails a higher tax burden and induces a higher investment in R&D than one of strict authorization if π > β(1−p)∆ 1−β .
The above proposition shows that lenient authorization is preferred when the net social benefit of the safe product is greater than the differential externality weighed by the probability that the good is unsafe. Intuitively, strict authorization is a more prudent approach because an unsafe product is never produced. However, it entails some costs due to the lost opportunity of producing a safe product when there is no conclusive evidence of its effects on society -event which occurs with probability (1−β)(1−p). Therefore, the cost of strict authorization is higher when 1 − β and π are larger, where π measures the value of the lost opportunity. In contrast, lenient authorization is a more daring approach because the good may be produced despite being unsafe. Accordingly, it entails a high cost for the society when the unsafe product is authorized because conclusive evidence of its negative externality is not available, event which occurs with probability β(1 − p).
As a result, the cost of lenient authorization is higher when β and ∆ take larger values. 7 Interestingly, the regulatory decision is independent of p. This is because the accuracy of the signal affects the costs and benefits of the two regimes in the same way.
The tax burden is higher in a regime of lenient authorization because the expected externality caused by the production of the innovation is greater. However, the tax burden decreases in the precision of the signal, since this reduces the likelihood that an unsafe good is granted authorization. Consequently, equilibrium investment is higher in a regime of lenient authorization than in one of strict authorization provided that the accuracy of the signal is high enough so that the firm is less discouraged to invest. In other words, the more precise the signal, the lower the expected tax burden facing the firm, the higher the investment. If the signal is not accurate enough, the tax would be so high in a regime of lenient authorization that the firm would be unwilling to invest in R&D. This explains why we obtain the somewhat unexpected result that strict authorization may foster more investment in R&D.
Corrupt public officials
Is the optimal design of regulation affected by the presence of corruptible public officials?
The assumption that all public officials are incorruptible and pursue the public good may be far-fetched. As argued in the introduction, corruption of public officials who can grant approval of new products or processes is rife, especially in countries with weak institutions. In this subsection, we deal with the other polar and unrealistic case in which public officials are always corrupt.
In the analysis that follows a corruptible public official may be willing to conceal conclusive evidence about the social effects of the innovation in exchange for a payment b paid by the firm. 8 We assume that conclusive evidence can be concealed but cannot be forged. Namely, following Tirole (1986) and Laffont and Tirole (1991) , we say that the information collected by the public official is hard. We make the following assumptions concerning how the collusion sub-game plays out. The parties are assumed to have symmetric information about the evidence collected by the public official and bargain cooperatively according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution in which the firm receives a share α ∈ [0, 1] of the gains from collusion. We further assume that the side-contract between the parties 7 Drugs which show promise in treating serious conditions and fill unmet medical needs can be granted earlier approval through the FDA's Accelerated Approval Program (see https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/healthprofessionals/ucm313768.htm). This is consistent with the result that activities which may exhibit greater social benefits should not be subject to a strict authorization regime.
8 Clearly, this is a short-cut to model the phenomena of corruption and regulatory capture. Bribes may take various forms which include, but are not limited to, direct monetary transfers. Other forms can be non-monetary gifts, the promise of a job for the public official or for a relative, and other exchanges of favors.
is perfectly enforceable. 9 We do not solve for the optimal corruption-proof mechanism, that is, we do not work out a system of report-contingent transfers paid to the public official to preempt corruption. Despite the well-established argument made in their favor in the economics literature, such schemes are little used in practice and may be infeasible as they may require very high payments to public servants (see Dal Bó, 2006 and Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009 ). The two authorization regimes have remarkable implications for the types of corruption opportunities. In a lenient-authorization regime, the parties could negotiate a bribe in exchange of which the public official conceals evidence that the good is socially harmful, since the lack of decisive information about the good does not prevent production. The firm's threat point is nil, because if the information is revealed it will not be allowed to produce the good. Similarly, the public official's threat point is zero, because she does receive the same salary -which we have normalized to zero -irrespective of the content of the report. Therefore, the bribe solves the following:
Since there are obvious gains from colluding, production would always be allowed. However, in deciding the investment level, the firm will take into account that in the case of a breakthrough with probability βp the public official will authorize production but will reap (1 − α) of the net private gains. Therefore, the investment decision will be made to maximize the following:
If α = 0, namely if the firm does not have any bargaining power, the investment decision is the same as when the public officials are honest. The optimal investment as a function of t satisfies the following:
A lower α has a negative impact on the firm's investment choice because it means that the share of profits accruing to the public official is larger. Welfare gives:
Note that b is a transfer between the firm and the public official. As a result, it does not enter directly the welfare equation. In stage 0, the regulator will announce the tax that a firm will have to pay if production is allowed. The following lemma characterizes the tax, investment, and welfare levels in a regime of lenient authorization when public officials are corrupt.
Lemma 3. When public officials are corrupt, in a regime of lenient authorization the regulator sets the following tax if production is allowed: 16) which is increasing in α. The firm does not pay any tax if production does not take place.
The investment in innovation satisfies the following:
It holds that I LA C ≤ I LA and W LA C ≤ W LA and both inequalities hold strictly if π > β(1−p)∆ 1−βp .
The regulator sets a tax which is decreasing in the public official's bargaining power. When α > 0, the tax is always higher than when the public officials are honest, because the firm is expected to produce also when there is evidence that the good is unsafe. The higher tax leads to a reduction in the investment which is below the level observed for the case of honest public officials. Moreover, the tax is set in such a way that investment incentives and welfare are not affected by α. Interestingly, equilibrium investment and welfare are independent of the accuracy of the signal. This is because the accuracy of the signal does not impact on the probability that the good is authorized or not. As expected, the presence of corrupt public officials causes a reduction in social welfare when authorization is lenient.
With strict authorization, bribery may occur if the public official has collected conclusive evidence that is favorable to the firm: by concealing such information, the firm would not be allowed to produce. We assume that the public official would be willing to follow through on her threat to conceal evidence if the parties do not find an agreement. Since there is evidence available showing that the good would be socially beneficial, we also assume that the firm can appeal the public official's decision and with probability γ ∈ [0, 1] it wins and is allowed to produce. The public official does not suffer any loss if the firm wins the appeal. The parameter γ represents the strength of the country's institutions and higher values imply that the public official is able to extract less surplus in the bargaining with the firm. In particular, the firm knows that if bargaining with the public official breaks down, it can appeal the decision, getting γ(Π−t). Better institutions improve the firm's threat point in the bargaining with the public official. The bribe will be determined from the following:
The investment decision is determined by the following expression:
that is, replacing the value of b SA C :
The firm anticipates that if the investment is successful, it will be allowed to produce the good only if conclusive evidence is found. However, the firm will reap only a fraction γ(1 − α) + α of the benefits. Therefore, if α = 1, the firm is in the same situation as when the public official is always honest, whereas it only obtains a fraction γ of the profits if α = 0. The equilibrium investment level as a function of t satisfies:
The positive effect of α on the investment decision is mitigated by the possibility of appealing the public official's decision to deny authorization for production. Welfare gives:
Lemma 4. In a regime of strict authorization, when public officials are corrupt, the regulator sets the following tax if production is permitted:
The investment equation satisfies
The direct tax paid by the firm to produce the good is always weakly lower than the tax paid when the public officials are honest. However, the firm only reaps a fraction of the net profits when the good is safe and there is conclusive evidence about its state. Whenever γ < 1 and α < 1, the firm must pay an indirect tax to the public official to have the production authorized. Anticipating this, the regulator will impose a lower tax burden on the firm. It is interesting to note that the level of the investment as well as social welfare are the same as when the public officials are honest. Therefore corruption does not have any impact on welfare if authorization is strict. Furthermore, the probability that evidence is collected continues to positively impact on welfare, whereas the strength of the institutions, as measured by γ, are irrelevant. Since corruption was found to negatively impact on the welfare attainable in a regime of lenient authorization, the region of parameters for which strict authorization dominates expands, as highlighted in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. When public officials are corrupt, the benevolent regulator prefers a regime of lenient authorization to one of strict authorization if and only if
While p does not affect social welfare comparison when public officials are honest, it plays a more prominent role when public officials are corrupt. This is because it only impacts on social welfare in a regime of strict authorization. A higher precision of the signal shrinks the parameter region for which lenient authorization should be adopted. The advantages of lenient authorization are tied to its effectiveness in stimulating investment. Indeed, welfare is higher in this regime when it involves a higher investment in R&D than a regime of strict authorization.
This subsection has shown that in the presence of taxes which are contingent on whether production is authorized or not, corruption may play a very critical role in determining the regulatory regime to follow. Corruption turns out not to be a concern if there is strict authorization, whereas it worsens welfare in a regime of lenient authorization. Intuitively, with strict authorization production occurs only if there is conclusive evidence that the good is safe. Corruption only affects the distribution of the gains between the firm and the public officials. In contrast, with lenient authorization, corruption leads to production in an additional state of the world in which it would be desirable that production did not take place, since the good is unsafe.
In Figure 1 , we graphically compare social welfare in the two regimes as a function of β. 10 When the probability that the good is unsafe increases, welfare decrease in all regimes. If the risk that an unsafe product is authorized is sufficiently high, the tax will be set in such a way that the firm will be discouraged to invest in a regime of lenient authorization. Therefore the associated social welfare will be nil. Conversely, investment and social welfare are always positive in a regime of strict authorization, whose upside tends to be fairly limited though, since there might be social beneficial opportunities which would not be seized. The regime od strict authorization dominates when the probability that the innovative product is unsafe is high enough. The figure also illustrates how the possibility of corruption moves the welfare curve under lenient authorization downwards, whereas the curve under strict authorization does not budge. This implies that the threshold value of β above which strict authorization is socially preferred is reduced in the presence of corruption concerns. 
General setting
Now we briefly carry out the analysis for the more general and realistic setting in which a fraction of the public officials are incorruptible. In particular, we assume that a public official is honest with probability υ ∈ [0, 1] so as to encompass the cases described in the previous subsections. The public official's type is her private information and the firm learns her type at the bargaining stage. Akin to Besley and McLaren (1993) , we make the assumption that preference for an honest behavior is immutable. This implies that an honest public official values his integrity more than any bribe he could extract from the firm. In contrast, a dishonest public official is merely interested in maximizing his income.
As expected, in a regime of lenient authorization, welfare and investment are decreasing in the fraction of corruptible public officials. Corruptible public officials are willing to collude to authorize production of goods which are known to be unsafe. For this reason, the regulator sets a higher tax when the risk of corruption is more likely. In turn, this discourages investment. Conversely, in a regime of strict authorization, welfare and investment are the same irrespective of the fraction of corruptible public officials. The tax is increasing in υ, implying that it would be optimal to lessen a firm's tax burden when there is a higher risk of corruption, in order not to excessively discourage investment. The more likely bribe paid to the public official acts as an indirect tax the firm must pay to be allowed to produce a safe good and substitutes the lower direct tax paid to the regulator. The level of the tax is fine-tuned in such a way that the total expected tax burdenobtained by summing up direct and indirect taxes -is unaffected by the probability of facing a corruptible public official, the bargaining power distribution, and the strength of the institutions.
Proposition 3. When public officials are corrupt with probability 1 − υ, the benevolent regulator prefers a regime of lenient authorization to one of strict authorization if and only if
The threshold above which the regime of lenient authorization dominates is decreasing in the likelihood that the public official is honest. Referring to Figure 1 , the level of welfare in a regime of lenient authorization as a function of β is a curve which lies between W LA C and W LA .
Taxes and Regulation
In this section, we study how our assumption on the structure of the tax has affected our results and we draw some conclusions on the relation between the optimal authorization regime and the ability to tailor the tax to the outcome of the regulatory process.
Tax contingent on regulatory evidence
Suppose that the regulator could impose a tax contingent on both the production decision and the signal collected by the public official. This does not affect the solutions previously described for the strict authorization regime. There, production is allowed only if there is positive evidence that the good is safe. Hence, there is only one level of tax that must be selected by the regulator. The conclusion is sharply different for the lenient authorization regime because the regulator will announce a schedule at the beginning of the game
is the tax that the innovative firm must pay to produce the good if there is no conclusive evidence about product safety, and t LA S is the tax that must be paid if the signal has revealed that the product is safe. The regulator has an additional instrument it can use to provide the firm with incentives to invest and produce. The following proposition shows that with such a tax schedule, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to a lenient-authorization regime.
Proposition 4. When the tax can be made contingent on both the production decision and the signal, lenient authorization weakly dominates strict authorization, i.e. W LA ≥ W SA .
Intuitively, with a lenient authorization regime it is always possible to replicate the solution under strict authorization by appropriately setting t LA ∅ . In particular, production may be discouraged if the signal is uninformative by setting a very high tax that the firm will be unwilling to pay. Moreover, if allowing production when evidence is inconclusive is socially desirable, t LA ∅ would be set in such a way that the firm is still willing to produce in those states, leading to a strict social preference for a regime of lenient authorization.
No taxes
It is also worth considering a setting wherein firms producing new products cannot be subject to discriminatory taxation. They pay the same taxes as the other firms in the economy and the regulator cannot make use of this instrument to influence production and investment decisions. Therefore, we now carry out the same analysis as in Section 3 assuming taxes away.
Honest public officials Suppose first that there are no corruption opportunities. Following the same reasoning as in the previous section, the firm's investment decision at stage 1 solves:
cI 2 2 Therefore, the optimal investment satisfies the following:
Investment is always above the first-best level and welfare gives:
Replacing the value of the investment found in (24) into the above equation, we obtain the level of welfare that is attained in a regime of lenient authorization:
Notice that a necessary condition for welfare to be positive is that π > h S . A higher likelihood that the good will be socially harmful and a more accurate signal unambiguously reduce welfare. While a higher precision of the signal discourages investment, it reduces the likelihood that products which are unsafe will be authorized and since the social costs of such unsafe goods outweigh the private benefits, its impact is positive. If authorization is strict, the firm's investment decision at stage 1 solves:
Therefore:
A higher p increases the probability that evidence that the good is safe is uncovered allowing production. Therefore, a higher p is associated with a higher investment. Investment can be greater or smaller than first-best. Welfare gives:
It follows that the level of welfare that would arise in a regime of strict authorization is:
Welfare positively depends on p and negatively on β. Notably, welfare is positive only if the difference π − h S is positive. Otherwise, the overall benefits brought about by the innovation are not enough to justify the costs incurred in the innovation phase. The optimal second-best regime in the absence of corruption is determined by comparing W SA and W LA . In the following proposition we show under what condition the regime of lenient authorization is preferred to one of strict authorization.
Proposition 5. When public officials are honest, the benevolent regulator prefers a regime of lenient authorization to one of strict authorization if and only if:
whereπ is strictly increasing and convex β and is decreasing in p.
The above proposition shows that lenient authorization is preferred when the net social benefit of the safe product is above a threshold value that we have labelledπ. A higher precision of the signal encourages the regulator to adopt a lenient authorization regime. In this case, the likelihood of finding out decisive evidence about whether the product is safe or unsafe is higher. This means that it is more difficult to allow production of a good which has large negative externalities. In contrast, an increase in β or in the social harm of the innovation, h S and h U , make the benevolent regulator lean towards the adoption of a more prudent approach.
An interesting question is whether the inability of imposing taxes favors or not a regime of strict authorization. In the following remark we compare the threshold values above which lenient authorization is the best regulatory regime from a social standpoint when public officials are honest, derived from Propositions (1) and (5).
Remark 1. When public officials are honest, the inability of imposing taxes makes the strict authorization regime more likely to be socially desirable.
With lenient authorization there is excessive production and investment, because the firm is authorized to produce unsafe goods if there is no evidence of their negative social repercussions. When the regulator can impose a tax on production, it can curb investment making the firm pay for the expected negative externality it causes by imposing a more burdensome tax.
Corrupt public officials
We carry out the same analysis as before for the case of corrupt public officials. Start with the lenient authorization regime. As the tax does not put a dent in the profit accruing to the firm, the bribe is simply the solution to the following:
Since there are obvious gains from colluding, production would always be allowed although evidence reveals that the good is socially harmful. However, in deciding the investment level, the firm will take into account that in the case of a breakthrough with probability βp the public official will authorize production but will reap (1 − α) of the net private gains. Therefore, the investment decision will be made to maximize the following:
If α = 1, namely if the firm holds all the bargaining power, the investment decision is the same as under laissez-faire. The optimal investment as a function of t satisfies the following:
A lower α has a negative impact on the firm's investment choice because it means that the profit share accruing to the public official is larger. Welfare gives:
A necessary condition for welfare to be positive is that Π > βh U +(1−β)h S , namely if the expected benefits from carrying out production are higher than the expected social cost, that is the negative externalities of the good in the safe and unsafe states weighed by the probability of the state of the world. Because a tax cannot be imposed, both investment and welfare depend on α.
With strict authorization, the bribe will be determined from the following:
The firm anticipates that if the investment is successful, it will be allowed to produce the good only if conclusive evidence is found. However, the firm will reap only a fraction γ(1 − α) + α of the benefits. Therefore, if α = 1, the firm is in the same situation as when the public official is always honest, whereas it only obtains a fraction γ of the profits if α = 0. The equilibrium investment level satisfies:
Unlike the scenario in which the regulator can impose tax on production, social welfare attainable in a regime of strict authorization in the absence of tax is affected by the possibility of corruption. As a result, both the bargaining power distribution and the strength of the institutions matter for welfare purposes. The following proposition determines a threshold above which lenient authorization dominates strict authorization when public officials are corrupt.
Proposition 6. When public officials are corrupt, the benevolent regulator prefers a regime of lenient authorization to one of strict authorization if and only if π ≥π, wherě
and the relationship betweenπ and both β and p is ambiguous.
The threshold in the proposition is found from comparing welfare under the two regimes. We now compareπ with the threshold above which the regime of lenient authorization is preferred to one of strict authorization when tax on production can be imposed, as determined in Proposition (2).
Remark 2. When public officials are corrupt, the inability of imposing taxes makes the strict authorization regime more likely to be socially desirable.
Therefore, the inability of imposing taxes favors or not a regime of strict authorization also when public officials are corrupt. The intuition is similar to that provided with honest officials. Lenient authorization leads to over-investment and production, which can at least partially limited through taxes. When taxes cannot be imposed, the benefits of a more prudent approach become more prominent.
It is worth noticing that it may well be the case that corruption is good for welfare. To understand why, consider that the absence of a tax implies that the firm cannot be made to internalize the external effects caused by production. Therefore, even in a regime of strict authorization there might be over-investment. When public officials are corrupt, the firm is less willing to invest because it anticipates that it will enjoy only a fraction of the gains from production. Therefore, corruption acts in the same fashion as an indirect tax, thereby mitigating the over-investment problem and leading to a higher welfare. This case is depicted in Figure 2 , which parallels Figure 1 for the scenario where taxes cannot be imposed. More specifically, in Figure 2 we graphically compare social welfare in the two regimes as a function of β. 11 For low values of β lenient authorization is still preferred to strict authorization. However as β takes higher values, the benefits of lenient authorization quickly decrease and can become negative. Corruption in this regime magnifies the expected welfare costs. In contrast, in the regime of strict authorization corruption may lead to higher welfare. The ensuing implication is that an institutional improvement, as measured by the parameter γ, may actually hurt society as it would decrease the indirect tax that the firm faces causing over-investment. Discussion Unlike strict authorization, a regime of lenient authorization enables production of innovative goods for which evidence of their safety is lacking. This has ad-11 The figure is drawn assuming the following values for the parameters: h U = 5, Π = 3, h S = 1, p = 0.5, c = 2.5, α = 0.5, γ = 0.5. vantages and disadvantages. The former is that it allows production of socially beneficial goods. The latter is that unsafe goods can be produced as well. Hence, this approach is less prudent and, other things being equal, should be preferred when the probability that the good is unsafe, β, and the differential externality, ∆, are low.
When the regulator can also use the tax, the firm can be made to bear some of the expected social cost that its activity generates. This helps reduce the disadvantages associated with a regime of lenient authorization. In particular, when the tax can be made contingent on the signal collected by the regulator, there is no benefit from using strict authorization. If the risk of producing an unsafe good is too high, the tax can be set in such a way that the firm is unwilling to produce when evidence is inconclusive. In that case, welfare is the same under the two authorization regimes. If the risk is not too high, the tax can be set in a way that the firm is still willing to undertake production if the evidence is inconclusive and welfare is strictly higher than under strict authorization.
When the tax can only depend on whether the firm undertakes production or not, the regime of strict authorization may dominate. This is exactly because the tax cannot be perfectly tailored to make the firm pay the expected social cost when regulatory evidence is inconclusive. Notably, the likelihood that the regime of strict authorization is preferred is increasing in the fraction of corrupt public officials.
In the absence of a tax, the argument for the adoption of a more prudent approach is stronger: the firm cannot be made to bear the social costs that its activity generates. Therefore, its incentive to over-invest and over-produce in a regime of lenient authorization cannot be limited.
Ex-post Liability
Let us assume that courts can fine a firm when an accident occurs. We assume that the courts cannot gather evidence on the type of product that the firm has produced. Only the regulator and its public officials have the capability of collecting evidence on the product safety. 12 Let us begin by considering an institutional setting wherein firms are free to produce innovative goods -that is a regulator cannot collect evidence on the safety of the innovation. However, if an accident occurs, firms face liability. The social planner can at the very beginning of the game commit to a fine that the firm will have to pay if there is an accident. The envisioned legal regime is one of strict liability.
Specifically, the timing of the game is as follows. At the onset, the social planner commits to a fine f the firm will have to pay if an accident occurs. Knowing the fine, the firm makes the investment and, in the case of a breakthrough, it decides whether or not to produce. Later on, if an accident occurs, the court imposes the predetermined fine on the firm.
As before we solve the game backwards and we can distinguish between two main scenarios, depending on whether or not the fine that can be imposed on the firm is bounded or not. The firm may not have enough financial resources to cover the entire cost of the disaster and in most jurisdictions the firm's resources set a ceiling to the maximum fine which can be imposed on firms. The firm is assumed not to own assets and a natural ceiling to the fine that can be imposed by the court is represented by the profit that would otherwise accrue to the firm.
When the fine is unbounded, i.e. f ∈ R + , the benevolent social planner will optimally set a fine which induces the firm to make the first-best investment and production decisions. This optimal fine is f = H. Confronted with such fine, a firm will find it profitable to produce only in the good state, since it holds that Π ∈ (h S , h U ). 13 Moreover, at the investment stage the firm will choose I so as to maximize:
cI 2 2 Namely, with the optimal unbounded fine, the firm is made to internalize the social cost caused by the innovative good.
Unsurprisingly, an environment wherein fines are bounded dramatically limits the effectiveness of this tool to induce firm's compliance. In what follows, we assume that the firm can pay up to the profit that it has earned if an accident occurs. The Maximal Punishment Principle (Becker, 1968 ) applies and the firm will pay Π in the event of an accident. Such a fine is not enough to deter the firm from carrying out production of an unsafe product because U < 1. The firm will only partially take into account the social repercussions of the production of an unsafe good -meaning that investment is below, and social welfare is above, that observed in a regime of laissez-faire. The following proposition summarizes the optimal fines, investments, and welfare in a regime of ex-post liability.
Proposition 7. When fines are unbounded, f = H, investment and production decisions are first-best, and as a result, first-best welfare is achieved. If fines are bounded, f = Π, production takes place in both states of the world, there is over-investment, and welfare is below first-best.
In a regime of unbounded fines, there is no need for regulation, whereas there might be scope for regulation when fines are bounded and below we study the optimal interplay between ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability.
Ex-ante Regulation and Ex-post Liability
A regime in which ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability are jointly used to induce the firm to make more socially desirable investment and production decisions may lead to a higher level of welfare than a regime where only liability or regulation is employed. This result was shown by Shavell (1984) in a setting in which a firm must be induced to expend resources to reduce the probability of an accident. In Shavell (1984) the presence of liability reduces the regulatory standard: therefore, it may be interesting to see whether a result with a similar flavor arises in this different environment, that is whether fines make a lenient authorization regime more socially desirable.
If regulation and liability coexist, the game unfolds as follows. At the onset, the regulator announces the tax the firm will pay if it decides to go on with production of the innovative good, as well as the fine if an accident occurs. The fine is assumed to be contingent on regulatory evidence. Knowing the tax and the fine schedule, the firm decides how much to invest in R&D. If a breakthrough occurs, the regulator collects a signal about the good safety. If production is authorized, the firm decides to produce the good or not and if an accident occurs the firm will have to pay the announced fine.
It is easy to show that when the regulator can impose a tax, there is no additional benefit from using (bounded) fines. Intuitively, ex-post liability does not give rise to additional signals about product safety and cannot improve the firm's incentives to invest and produce. For instance, consider a regime of strict authorization with honest public officials. The optimal tax in the absence of fines has been found to be t = h S so that the firm will pay a tax equal to the expected value of the social harm that production generates. If the regulator can set a fine contingent on the occurrence of the accident, any positive fine would force the firm to bear an excessive burden. Hence, the regulator should optimally set t = h S − S f S , with f S ∈ [0, Π − t] and the problem is over-determined. The same argument applies in a regime of lenient authorization where the attainable social welfare is unchanged if the regulator can also use a fine schedule. Note also that there is a negative relationship between tax and fines: higher fines reduce taxes.
When the regulator cannot impose a tax, the fine schedule improves welfare because the regulator can make the firm (partially) bear the negative externalities caused by production. However, fines are not as effective as taxes in aligning private and social interests. The reason is that fines are paid only when an accident occurs and are limited above by the firm's assets. In contrast, taxes are paid with certainty when the firm decides whether or not to undertake production of the innovative good. Furthermore, the tax can be set in such a way that the firm is unwilling to produce and, in turn, to invest if there is an excessive risk that the good will be unsafe.
Therefore, when a tax can be imposed, regulation can preempt liability if litigation occurs. However, if fines are used, taxes should be commensurately lower. The presence of courts does not affect the choice of the authorization regime, though. If the regulator cannot set a tax, fines improve welfare.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the optimal choice of the authorization regime for goods which may exhibit negative externalities. We have focused on how regulation can impact on firm's investment incentives. We have found that the pros and cons of alternative regulatory regimes may be critically affected by the corruption risk and the regulator's ability to tax firms. A strict authorization regime always avoids that socially harmful goods are produced. This comes at the expense of losing the opportunity to approve production of socially beneficial goods, when evidence of their safety is lacking. This more prudent approach is more likely to be favored over a lenient authorization regime when the regulator's tax ability is lower, and when the risk of corruption and the likelihood that the good is unsafe are higher. The inability to tax the firm depending on the regulatory evidence prevents the regulator from aligning private and public interests in a regime of lenient authorization and is a necessary condition for a regime of strict authorization to emerge as the best regulatory approach. The higher the probability that the good is unsafe, the larger the potential costs associated with a regime of lenient authorization. Finally, corruption is shown to have a stronger negative impact on a regime of lenient authorization because the parties may find it profitable to strike an agreement to allow production of socially harmful goods. This exacerbates the potential downside of such regime. On the contrary, corruption may even be socially beneficial in a regime of strict authorization. This occurs when the anticipation of blackmail mitigates the firm's tendency to devote excessive resources to investment in R&D.
We have mentioned several real-world applications for our analysis: from the approval process of drugs and vaccines to the authorization of new production technologies which are suspected of adversely affecting the environment. Another topical application concerns financial regulation. Most customers may have difficulty understanding features of more sophisticated financial products, which should then be subject to a more stringent authorization regime: for instance, by authorizing trade opportunities to accredited investors only. 14 The design of consumer financial protection is an active field of research in economics and finance and centers on financial consumers' behavioral biases and cognitive limitations and is especially concerned about its distributional implications (e.g. see Campbell et al., 2011) .
The policy prescriptions of our model rest on several modeling assumptions. We conclude by discussing the implications of relaxing some of them, which we leave for future research. A critical assumption which is maintained throughout the paper is that the regulator is benevolent and maximizes social welfare. This is because our aim is to study the optimal regulatory regime from a normative standpoint. It may be interesting to relax this assumption and see whether and to what extent this alters our results. In a related paper, Immordino and Pagano (2010) also allow for self-interested regulators in their model and compare empirically the predictions of the two alternative regulatory models (benevolent versus self-interested).
In our model, the firm's production decision is binary: either it produces the innovative good or it does not. Immordino et al. (2011) assume that the firm can decide the activity level which increases profits. The same authors distinguish between marginal and average deterrence effects of penalties: the former affects the choice of the activity level, whereas the latter affects the investment decision. By allowing for a similar production decision, we could shed light on more general results on the interplay between regulatory regime, taxation, and corruption opportunities.
Another extension that it may be worth undertaking concerns relaxing the assumption that the preference for an honest behavior is a steadfast trait of the public official's personality. We could entertain a scenario in which public officials may be heterogeneous in the value they attach to their own integrity and may be willing to engage in corruption, provided that the bribe they can extract from the firm is sufficiently large. By affecting the net gains that the parties can split in a side-contract, the tax would also have an impact on the likelihood that corruption takes place.
Proof of Proposition 1
A straightforward comparison between W LA and W SA when π ≥ β(1−p)∆
(1−βp) shows that lenient authorization gives rise to a higher level of welfare if π > β∆. To see that we are comparing the right value of W LA note that if π > β∆, it always holds that π ≥ β(1−p)∆
(1−βp) . As for the tax, t LA > t SA since h U > h S . Comparing equilibrium investments, note that I LA > I SA if (1 − β)π > β(1 − p)∆ which can be rewritten as reported in the text of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 3
Replacing the value of I LA C (t) into (15) we obtain:
c In stage 0, the regulator sets t to maximize social welfare. From the first-order condition, we obtain:
Replacing t LA C into the investment equation,
and is easy to retrieve the welfare attainable with lenient authorization:
if π ≥ β∆ 0 otherwise To see that t LA C > t LA note that this inequality is satisfied if:
Since Π = π + h S , this can be rewritten as:
which always holds because (1−α)(1−βp) 1−βα−βp(1−α) < 1 and ∆ > π. To see the relationship between I LA C and I LA , first note that the threshold above which equilibrium investment is positive is higher when public officials are corrupt, i.e. β∆ > β(1−p)∆ 1−βp . Then note that when investments are positive in both scenarios,
Proof of Lemma 4
Replacing the value of I SA C (t) in equation (20), we obtain the following expression for welfare as a function of t:
In stage 0, the regulator sets t to maximize social welfare. From the first-order condition, we obtain
Substituting this value in the investment equation,
Welfare is easily obtained:
The expressions can be easily rewritten as shown in the text of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2
A straightforward comparison between W SA C and W LA C shows that the former is greater if β∆ > [1 − p + βp]π. If the same condition holds, investment is higher with strict authorization. Tax burden is always higher under lenient authorization: to see this, note that t SA C ≤ t SA , t LA C > t LA , and t LA > t SA .
The optimal fine is f = H. The firm will be willing to produce the good safe if Π ≥ S H = h S , which is always the case. Furthermore, confronted with such fine the firm will not produce the unsafe good because Π < U H = h U . The firm's investment is:
(1 − β)π c = I * and welfare will be at first best. The regulator is unwilling to charge a different fine with different implications for production decisions, since this would invariably lead to a lower welfare.
If the firm is wealth constrained and cannot pay more than its gross profit Π, the first-best is no longer achievable with the fine only. To see this note that the fine f = H would not satisfy the wealth constraint because Π − H < 0. 15 Therefore when the fine is bounded the regulator cannot impose a fine which is above Π. The regulator will exactly set the maximum possible fine, i.e. f = Π -which means that the Maximum Punishment Principle applies. Confronted with this fine, the firm will be willing to produce in both states of the world: when the good is unsafe, if the firm decides to go on with production, it will get Π(1 − U ) > 0. The investment satisfies:
and welfare is:
From a social viewpoint, there is excessive production and investment.
15 Note that by assumption h U > Π and h U = U H and U < 1.
